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Abstract
The topic of government–nonprofit collaboration continues to be much-discussed in the litera-
ture. However, there has been little consensus on whether and how collaborating with govern-
ment is beneficial for the performance of community-based nonprofits. This article examines three 
dominant theoretical interpretations of the relationship between collaboration and performance: 
collaboration is necessary for the performance of nonprofits; the absence of collaboration is ne-
cessary for the performance of nonprofits; and the effect of collaboration is contingent on the 
nonprofits’ bridging and bonding network ties. Building on the ideas of governance, nonprofit, 
and social capital in their respective literature, this article uses set-theoretic methods (fsQCA) to 
conceptualize and test their relationship. Results show the pivotal role of the nonprofit’s network 
ties in mitigating the effects of either collaborating or abstaining from collaborating with govern-
ment. Particularly, the political network ties of nonprofits are crucial to explaining the relationship 
between collaboration and performance. The evidence demonstrates the value of studying collab-
oration processes in context.
  
Introduction
Nonprofits—such as associations, trusts, and co-
operatives—play an essential role in providing local 
community services (Marwell 2004; Milward and 
Provan 2000). They offer homeless people shelter, 
give extra food to the poor, or simply provide extra 
services to their community. The nonprofit literature 
has established that there is a wide variability among 
nonprofits regarding mission, function, and the provi-
sion of services (Galaskiewicz, Bielefeld, and Dowell 
2006; Smith and Lipsky 1994). In this study, we focus 
on community-based nonprofits in which health and 
human services are provided to and on behalf of the 
community (Edelenbos, Van Meerkerk, and Schenk 
2018; Marwell 2007). Although community-based 
nonprofits significantly contribute to addressing pov-
erty and degeneration at the neighborhood level, they 
are, just like governments, unable to solve these kinds 
of complex issues in isolation (Halpern 1995; Marwell 
2016). Hence, to address pressing social problems, 
nonprofits are increasingly engaged in cross-sector 
collaborations (Cornforth, Hayes, and Vangen 2015). 
By collaboration, we mean the process by which or-
ganizations with a stake in a problem seek a mutually 
determined solution (see Sink 1998). In this collab-
orative process, government and nonprofit organiza-
tions pursue joint objectives by sharing information, 
exchanging resources, and developing joint activities 
(Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2016; Gazley 2008). Despite 
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the potentials of government–nonprofit collaboration 
(Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2006; Gazley and Guo 
2020), it is still unclear whether this kind of collabor-
ation benefits the local community. Systematic insight 
into the relationship between government–nonprofit 
collaboration and the performance of community-
based nonprofits, of which serving the local commu-
nity is their main purpose, is scarce (see Cornforth, 
Hayes, and Vangen 2015; Stone and Sandfort 2009). 
Performance in this context is determined by consid-
ering the dimensions of “effectiveness,” “legitimacy,” 
and “resilience” (see Emerson and Nabatchi 2015; 
Hood 1991).
While some scholars argue that collaboration 
and performance go hand-in-hand (e.g., co-creating 
public value), others argue that collaboration with 
government poses huge risks for the performance of 
community-based nonprofits and should be avoided 
(e.g., protecting public value). Still others argue that the 
relationship between collaboration and performance 
depends on the power position of community-based 
nonprofits in terms of their community network (CN) 
and political network (PN) ties. This study aims to 
clarify this debate by unraveling which conditions are 
necessary and/or sufficient for the perceived perform-
ance of community-based nonprofits. Consequently, 
this study makes two major contributions. First, 
on a theoretical level, it contributes to the literature 
by clarifying a core aspect of the debate on govern-
ment–nonprofit collaboration: does collaboration 
with government go hand-in-hand with outstanding 
performance of community-based nonprofits? And 
what role does the political and community network 
of community-based nonprofits play in explaining 
this set-relationship? It assesses these questions by 
connecting and combining contributions from the lit-
erature of three prominent bodies: collaborative gov-
ernance, nonprofits, and social capital. In doing so, 
this article responds to the call for scholars to integrate 
contributions from multiple theories and disciplines in 
studying cross-sector collaborations (Bryson, Crosby, 
and Stone 2016; Cornforth, Hayes, and Vangen 2015). 
Second, on a methodological level, this study innov-
ates the study of cross-sector collaborations by using a 
set-theoretic configurational comparative approach to 
unravel the complex and dynamic interplay between 
necessary and sufficient conditions (Bryson, Crosby, 
and Stone 2016; Schneider and Wagemann 2012). 
Contrary to previous studies that have mainly focused 
on variable-driven case studies or survey designs to 
study government–nonprofit collaboration (see Gazley 
and Guo 2020), this study relies on identifying set-
relationships to provide critical insight into whether 
collaboration works only, or mainly, in combination 
with certain conditions.
This study is structured as follows. First, the the-
oretical section describes the three interpretations of 
the relationship between government collaboration 
and perceived performance of community-based 
nonprofits. After describing the methods, data, and 
calibration strategy, the results are presented. In the 
final section, important conclusions and avenues for 
future research are discussed.
Explaining Performance: Three Interpretations
There is a massive literature on the relationship be-
tween collaboration and performance. Within this 
literature, it is possible to distinguish coherent clus-
ters that share a specific focus on certain elements or 
values. For the purpose of this study, we have discerned 
three ideal-typical interpretations that reflect clusters 
in the collaborative governance, nonprofit, and social 
capital literature. Each interpretation, and its expect-
ations on the relationship between collaboration and 
performance, will be discussed briefly. We do not strive 
toward a definitive clustering of the literature, but ra-
ther for a lens that can be used to empirically unravel 
the role of government collaboration in the perform-
ance of community-based nonprofits.
Interpretation 1: Collaboration Is Necessary for 
Performance
The first interpretation builds upon the idea that col-
laboration is a prerequisite for achieving outstanding 
performance. The core assumption that underlies the 
literature on (collaborative) governance is that tackling 
complex problems typically requires a combination 
of various resources that are owned or controlled by 
different organizations (Berry et  al. 2004; Emerson, 
Nabatchi, and Balogh 2011). Overlapping missions, 
therefore, make it almost inevitable for governments 
and community-based nonprofits to engage in some 
sort of collaborative activity (CA) to accomplish their 
main objectives (Healey 2015; King and Cruickshank 
2012). These CA can consist of sharing information, 
exchanging resources, and developing joint activities 
(Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2016; Howlett, Kekez, 
and Poocharoen 2017). Pursuing CA with government 
enables the small and locally organized community-
based nonprofits to attract and acquire more resources 
for achieving their organization’s mission, for example, 
outstanding performance. For community-based 
nonprofits, the financial and regulatory resources that 
governments possess are especially critical as they gen-
erally lack these resources (Dale and Newman 2010; 
Nederhand, Bekkers, and Voorberg 2016). In sum, 
this interpretation emphasizes the added (and ne-
cessary) value of collaboration for the performance 
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hypothesized that the condition of CA is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for perceived outstanding 
performance (P). The backward arrow “←” means “is 
necessary for”:
H1 : CA ← P
Interpretation 2: The Absence of Collaboration Is 
Necessary for Performance
The second interpretation argues that the absence of 
collaboration is necessary for achieving outstanding 
performance of community-based nonprofits. While 
the nonprofit literature agrees that CA between the 
public and nonprofit sector have both practical and 
political benefits, nevertheless, much of the relevant 
scholarship also highlights the potential disadvantages 
of a nonprofit sector, that is, too reliant on government 
funding and programs (see Brooks 2000; O’Regan and 
Oster 2002; Smith and Lipsky 1993). Being the weaker 
actor in relation to government, the small-scale local 
community-based nonprofits easily run the risk of 
being overruled and consequently lose some of their dis-
tinctive nature and qualities (see Anheier, Toepler, and 
Wojciech Sokolowski 1997; Brandsen, Trommel, and 
Verschuere 2017; Brooks 2002; Korosec and Berman 
2006). For nonprofits, relying on government has been 
associated with a loss of managerial autonomy, mis-
sion infidelity, and bureaucratization (Eikenberry and 
Kluver 2004; Jang and Feiock 2007; Minkoff and 
Powell 2006; Salamon 2006; Suarez 2011). This, in 
turn, could lead nonprofits to prioritize performance 
measures related to external ideas of what “perform-
ance” looks like (efficiency, equality) at the expense of 
a more organic definition of performance that might 
uphold other values (interpersonal connection, re-
sponsiveness). These kinds of commitments greatly re-
strict the freedom of policy and action for nonprofits 
to be responsive to community needs (Smith and 
Lipsky 1994). This may even result in the destruction 
of the self-governance capacity of community-based 
nonprofits (Brandsen, Trommel, and Verschuere 2017; 
Korosec and Berman 2006). Moreover, the changed—
more rule-bound—character of nonprofits can lead to 
diminished community support as people (donors and 
volunteers) are more attracted to community-based 
nonprofits that appear strong and independent and can 
maintain control over the organization (Brooks 2000). 
Or, as Smith and Lipsky (1994) point out, those that 
“[…] deal with citizens sympathetically and without 
having to reduce them to a set of official characteris-
tics.” As a result, some nonprofits avoid public money 
altogether out of concern for these threats to their 
performance (Gazley and Brudney 2007). According 
to Marwell and Calabrese (2015), the concern about 
the negative effect of government affiliation turns on 
a view of community-based nonprofits that privileges 
self-governance. Hence, it is hypothesized that the ab-
sence of CA is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition 
for perceived outstanding performance. The backward 
arrow “←” means “is necessary for,” and the tilde sign 
“ ~” denotes the absence of a factor:
H2 :∼ CA ← P
Interpretation 3: Collaboration Interplays With 
Political and Community Network Ties
The third interpretation considers that the effect of 
government collaboration is contingent on its interplay 
with the CN and PN of community-based nonprofits. 
Based on social capital literature, this interpretation 
underlines the strategic importance of bonding and 
bridging network ties for enhancing the perform-
ance and relative power position of organizations 
(Galaskiewiz et  al. 2006; Lin 2001; Szreter 2002). 
Whereas bonding ties refers to trusting and coopera-
tive relations between people of a network with a 
shared social identity, bridging ties refers to relations 
between people who are heterogeneous in the sense 
of social identity (Putnam 2000; Szreter 2002). With 
regard to government–nonprofit collaboration, it may 
be expected that both types of network ties help to 
smooth the collaboration process with government by 
increasing the resistance of nonprofits to severe pres-
sures from government. The presence of bridging PN 
ties has an important symbolic value. According to 
Lewis (2010), even if the PN is not activated, it can 
play a role in the background by enhancing the social 
standing of nonprofits. If they disagree with the way 
the collaboration is involved, they can try to go “over 
the heads” of public administrators by lobbying their 
superiors to overcome or reverse decisions. Therefore, 
community-based nonprofits with political influence 
have significant agenda-setting potential which some-
what equalizes the power balance between nonprofits 
and government. This strategic power resource could, 
in turn, foster a more careful and deliberate collabora-
tive approach by public officials and a stronger negoti-
ation position for organizations such as nonprofits to 
resist pressures (Lin 2001). The same goes for bonding 
CN ties. Community ties enhance the social standing 
of nonprofits as they increase their legitimacy as a 
collaborative partner (Edelenbos, Van Meerkerk, and 
Schenk 2018). Simultaneously, a close-knit CN can act 
as a buffer to government pressures by reinforcing the 
community identity and preserving resources. As such, 
a cohesive group tends to develop and guard group 
norms to prevent defection and to maintain the status 
quo (Coleman 1988; Putnam 2000). These network 
ties thus act as a buffer to protect community-based 
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consequences. Accordingly, hypothesis 3 states that 
the combination of CA with either bridging PN ties or 
bonding CN ties is a sufficient condition for perceived 
outstanding performance.
H3 : CA× (PN + CN) → P
When there are no CA between nonprofits and gov-
ernment, PN and CN ties make community-based 
nonprofits better resistant to a lack of resources. 
These networks are valuable alternatives for tapping 
into different capabilities, mobilizing resources, and 
transferring novel information (Provan et  al. 2005; 
Shrestha 2018). When engaging in frequent contact, 
community-based nonprofits gain better knowledge on 
the relevance and timelines of the relevant resources of 
political officeholders and community grassroot organ-
izations operating in the community. Moreover, greater 
familiarity with the nonprofit increases the readiness 
of partners to assist the community they care about 
(Shrestha 2018). These networks thus act as a buffer 
to protect community-based nonprofits against a lack 
of resources. Accordingly, hypothesis 4 states that the 
combination of the absence of CA with either PN ties 
or CN ties is a sufficient condition for perceived out-
standing performance.
H4 :∼ CA× (PN + CN) → P
It should be noted that the first and second interpret-
ations represent two different variants of the view on 
the government–nonprofit relationship. The first in-
terpretation hypothesizes a positive role for CA in the 
performance of community-based nonprofits, whereas 
the second interpretation hypothesizes a negative role 
for CA with government. The third interpretation high-
lights the decisiveness of PN and CN in the interaction 
with CA to trigger the performance of community-
based nonprofits. Although these interpretations are 
compatible, they are not identical. Their compatibility 
lies in the notion that CA (or their absence) can be 
necessary for performance (H1 and H2) and, in com-
bination with the network ties of community-based 
nonprofits, sufficient (H3 and H4). However, these in-
terpretations are not identical as the first and second 
interpretations imply CA (or their absence) to be a 
prerequisite for performance (necessity). On the other 
hand, the third and fourth interpretations assume that 
CA (or their absence) in situations of strong network 
relationships typically result in perceived outstanding 
performance (sufficiency).
Methods
To clarify the questions of whether and how collabor-
ation and network characteristics are necessary and/or 
sufficient for the perceived performance of nonprofits, 
14 community-based nonprofits in the Netherlands 
were studied. In this section, we first describe the em-
pirical setting of the study. Following that, we elab-
orate on fsQCA (fuzzy-set qualitative comparative 
analysis), the analytical tool used in this study. Finally, 
we turn to the operationalization and calibration of 
the conditions.
Community-Based Nonprofits in the Netherlands
The data used in this study stems from 14 community-
based health and human services nonprofit organiza-
tions in the Netherlands that were examined in the 
period between September 2017 and April 2018. We 
selected the nonprofits from the databases of Dutch 
umbrella organizations LSA, Vilans, and Kracht NL, 
by using the following three selection criteria. The first 
criterium was that the nonprofits had to be categorized 
as established organizations that transited the initiating 
phase. To ensure that the nonprofits were roughly in 
the same phase of development, we selected only cases 
that had been established between 2012 and 2015. We 
took 2012 as a starting point because this is the year 
that marks the start of major welfare sector reforms in 
the Netherlands in which the Dutch government de-
cided to cut-back welfare budgets and delegate respon-
sibilities “back” to communities (see Nederhand and 
Van Meerkerk 2018). Hence, the community-based 
nonprofits were developed in the anticipation of fa-
cing major welfare reforms and cuts. Given that these 
nonprofits were not “initiated” by the Dutch govern-
ment as part of an ambition to contract out services, 
their development was autonomous. We took 2015 as 
a cutoff point to ensure that, by the time of data collec-
tion, the nonprofits from the sample were all well es-
tablished. The second criterium was that the nonprofits 
should be truly community-based. This implies that 
they are independent, locally based organizations that 
provide services to residents in a particular geograph-
ical place (“community”). It is this requirement of 
serving a public rather than a private purpose that dis-
tinguishes nonprofits from associations. Community 
members participate in the organization’s activities as 
staff, volunteers, and board members. Services are thus 
provided to and on behalf of the community. The third 
criterium for our selection of nonprofits was to con-
sider their financial situation of whether they worked 
with a mixed revenue model, meaning that they were 
not solely reliant upon government funding. Moreover, 
to ensure that our cases formed a balanced reflection 
of the existing community-based nonprofits in the 
Netherlands, we included 4 cases located in small 
municipalities (<50k inhabitants); 3 cases in medium-
small sized municipalities (50k–100k inhabitants); 4 
cases in medium-large sized municipalities (100k–300k 
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To obtain systematic and comparable data, we 
combined two different methods: semi-structured 
interviews and surveys. In total, we conducted 50 semi-
structured interviews with nonprofit professionals 
and public officials. These respondents were selected 
on the basis of their close and strategic involvement 
with the community-based nonprofits. To represent 
the nonprofits, we selected the most active respond-
ents, mostly initiators and board members who were 
involved in managing the nonprofit and its external 
contacts. To represent the governmental municipal-
ities, we selected the public officials who had the most 
contact with a specific nonprofit. Based on these con-
tacts, the selected representatives were able to answer 
questions about the local role of the nonprofit in the 
community. During the interviews, respondents were 
asked to fill out a survey about the cases, and all 50 
respondents complied with this request. Additionally, 
four respondents only filled in the online survey. The 
respondents are spread evenly over the cases, with each 
case covered by 3–5 respondents.
Set-Theoretic Methods: A fsQCA
In this article, we are theoretically interested in exam-
ining relations between sets. For this reason, we em-
ployed the set-theoretic method of fsQCA (software: 
R packages QCA and SetMethods; Medzihorsky et al. 
2016). A  fsQCA allows for different degrees of set 
membership. An iterative dialogue between theoretical 
and substantive knowledge determines to what degree 
cases are members of a certain set. Thus, it established 
qualitative rather than quantitative differences be-
tween the cases.
In a fsQCA, relations are discussed in terms of ne-
cessity and sufficiency. A  condition is necessary if 
performance cannot be produced without it; a condi-
tion is sufficient if it can produce the outcome by it-
self without the help of other conditions (Rihoux and 
Ragin 2009; Schneider and Wagemann 2010). The two 
main parameters of fit used to analyze the results of a 
fsQCA are coverage and consistency. Coverage states 
how well the available empirical information is ex-
plained by the condition(s). For necessary conditions, 
coverage expresses relevance in terms of the condition 
set not being much larger than the outcome set, and 
the relevance of necessity (RoN) in terms of the con-
dition being close to constant. Low values indicate 
trivialness, whereas high values indicate relevance. The 
latter indicates the degree to which empirical evidence 
is in line with the statements of necessity or sufficiency 
(minimum of 0.75 for sufficient conditions, and 0.90 
for necessary conditions). The proportional reduction 
in inconsistency (PRI) indicates the degree to which a 
given configuration is not simultaneously sufficient for 
both the occurrence and nonoccurrence of the outcome 
(see Schneider and Wagemann 2012; Thomann, Van 
Engen, and Tummers 2018).
The models presented in this study have the highest 
performance regarding the parameters of fit. The truth 
tables, directional expectations, conservative and par-
simonious solutions, and simplifying assumptions are 
all provided in Appendices B and C.
Calibrating the Conditions
In this article, we study the performance of community-
based nonprofits using CA, the PN, and the CN of 
nonprofits as conditions. In this section, we elaborate 
on assigning set-memberships to our cases (see also 
tables 1–3 and Appendix A).
Each case will receive a score of 0 indicating full 
non-membership, 0.33 indicating partial non-member-
ship, 0.67 indicating partial membership, or 1 
indicating full membership. These scores display the 
membership of particular cases in each of the three 
conditions and the outcome.
Outstanding Performance
Calibrating outstanding performance is the first 
major task of this research. Since performance is an 
important element in this article, but also an essen-
tially contested concept (see Johnsen 2005; Stewart 
and Walsh 2009), we first elaborate how we define 
performance. The academic literature has examined 
performance and its dimensions in many different 
ways. Following Provan and Kenis (2008), we argue 
that measuring performance is a normative task. First, 
multiple actors have different beliefs about the criteria 
of performance and, thus, selecting the preferences of 
one group over another or assigning weights to prefer-
ences is a normative decision; and second, the criteria 
for measuring performance are normative (Kenis and 
Provan 2009). According to Simon (1976), assessment 
criteria are elements of value rather than elements of 
facts. In this article, we focus on the dimensions of 
“effectiveness,” “legitimacy,” and “resilience” to deter-
mine performance (see Emerson and Nabatchi 2015; 
Hood 1991). Based on the work of Igalla, Edelenbos, 
and Van Meerkerk (2020), who translated these per-
formance dimensions to the context of community-
based nonprofits, set membership is determined by the 
following three statements: “the nonprofit achieves its 
objectives”; “the nonprofit is considered important 
by the community”; and “the nonprofit would con-
tinue to exist if specific incomes and/or people were 
omitted.” Respondents ranked these statements on a 
5-point scale with 1 representing strongly disagree and 
5 strongly agree.
The literature on performance further distinguishes 
between objective and subjective measures to de-
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focus on subjective measures. Accordingly, we define 
performance as perceptions of the effectiveness, legit-
imacy, and resilience of community-based nonprofits. 
Using perceived outcomes as a measure of perform-
ance is a common strategy in the literature (see Klijn, 
Edelenbos, and Steijn 2010; Nederhand and Klijn 
2019). Furthermore, we combine two different kinds 
of subjective measures: self-evaluations and external 
evaluations. Combining these measures may help 
to overcome the limitations that are associated with 
each of these measures (see Meier and O’Toole 2013; 
Wang 2016). Whereas self-assessment measures are 
prone to personal bias, external-assessment meas-
ures lack in-depth knowledge and, thus, may capture 
only the surface. Here, self-evaluations will be based 
on the assessment of board members and key volun-
teers of collectives who have a broad oversight of 
the community-based collectives’ organization and 
services. External evaluations will be based on the as-
sessment of public officials in the municipality who 
are familiar with the community and the collectives’ 
services. These different evaluations were combined to 
construct a composite measure. On average, nonprofits 
and municipalities rank the performance of nonprofits 
very similarly. With regard to performance resilience 
that specifically concerns the internal functioning of 
the nonprofit, however, only self-evaluation scores of 
nonprofits are used. See table A1 in the Appendix for 
more specific calibration details.
Collaborative Activities
Set membership of the condition CA is determined 
by taking the amount of relationship activities be-
tween a specific nonprofit and a governmental muni-
cipality into account: no relationship activities = 0.00; 
one relationship activity = 0.33; two relationship ac-
tivities  =  0.67; three relationship activities  =  1.00. 
Following the definition of cross-sector collaboration 
by Bryson, Crosby, and Stone (2016), the first relation-
ship activity that was measured is dialogue. Dialogue 
is necessary for collaboration as dialogue enables the 
development of a shared understanding and commit-
ment to the process. Hence, it is difficult to imagine 
effective collaboration without face-to-face dialogue 
and information exchange (see Ansell and Gash 2008). 
Dialogue is measured by asking community-based 
nonprofits about the frequency of contact with public 
officials (on a weekly basis, monthly basis, half-yearly 
basis, yearly basis, never). The second relationship ac-
tivity that was measured is developing joint activities. 
Table 1. Overview of the Conditions




objectives (PER.E)  
Legitimacy: felt importance 
for community (PER.L)  
Resilience: continues to 
exist if specific incomes 
or people are omitted 
(PER.R)
Survey data Different performance dimensions included  
Score for effectiveness and legitimacy is based on average 
assessment of public officials and nonprofits; score for 
resilience is based on assessment of nonprofits only  
Cross-over point set conservatively to guarantee 
outstanding performance level of set
Collaborative 
activities (CA)
Dialogue with public 
officials  





Highest dialogue frequency score of respondents was used. 
Scores are based on assessment of nonprofits  
Highest score of respondents used for joint activities  
Scores for joint activities and resource exchange 
relationship are based on assessment of nonprofits and 
public officials  




Contact frequency elected 
officeholders  
Contact frequency local 
council members
Survey data Highest frequency score of respondents used  
Scores are based on assessment of nonprofits  




Contact frequency grassroot 
organizations
Survey data Highest frequency score of respondents used  
Scores are based on assessment of nonprofits  
Qualitative interview data are used to adjust and check 
scores
Note: The highest frequency scores are used because of functional specialization within governments and nonprofits. This choice implies 
that if, for example, one person within a nonprofit has intensive weekly contacts with elected officeholders and local council members about 
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Following the scholarship on co-production and 
co-creation, we define joint activities as being involved 
in a process of co-creating policies and policy object-
ives (see Howlett, Kekez, and Poocharoen 2017). It is 
this process, which facilitates and contributes to the 
alignment of different positions that is an inherent part 
of collaboration (Henry, Lubell, and McCoy 2011; 
Huxham and Vangen 2005). Hence, joint activity is 
rated by asking nonprofits whether they were actively 
involved in jointly drafting relevant municipal policies 
(1 = totally disagree, 5 = totally agree). The third rela-
tionship activity is measured in the presence of a re-
source exchange relationship. Exchanging resources 
is a key element of cross-sector collaboration (Klijn 
and Koppenjan 2016). In this study, this relation-
ship is measured by determining whether community 
services of the nonprofit are exchanged for financial 
government resources as laid down in a formal con-
tract. Despite having a mixed revenue model, these 
nonprofits are either substantially or primarily funded 
through financial government resources. The presence 
of such an exchange relationship is indicated by 1.00, 
the absence of this relationship by 0.00. See table A2 
in the Appendix for more specific calibration details.
Political Network Ties
Set membership of the condition PN ties is determined 
by taking the PN ties of community-based nonprofits 
into account: no PN ties = 0.00; little PN ties = 0.33; 
average PN ties  =  0.67; PN ties  =  1.00. The PN of 
nonprofits was determined by asking nonprofits about 
the frequency of contact with elected officeholders and 
with local city council members (on a weekly basis, 
monthly basis, half-yearly basis, yearly basis, never). 
The contact frequency measure is used in numerous 
studies to measure networking behavior (see Meier 
and O’Toole 2005 for an evaluation of its reliability 
and validity). The final set membership score is deter-
mined by translating qualitative frequency scores into 
set membership scores. See table A3 in the Appendix 
for more specific calibration details.
Community Network Ties
Although all community-based nonprofits provide 
services to and on behalf of the community and, as 
a result, have frequent contact with residents, some 
community-based nonprofits are more locally net-
worked with other community organizations than 
others. Set membership of the condition CN ties was 
determined by taking the CN ties of nonprofits into 
account: no CN ties = 0.00; CN ties based on frequent 
contact with one actor = 0.33; CN ties based on fre-
quent contact with two actors = 0.67; CN ties based 
on frequent contact with three actors = 1.00. To deter-
mine set membership, nonprofits were asked about the 
frequency of contact with community grassroot organ-
izations (on a weekly basis, monthly basis, half-yearly 
basis, yearly basis, never). The final set membership 
score was determined by translating qualitative fre-
quency scores into set membership scores. See table A4 
in the Appendix for more specific calibration details.
Results
The results of the analyses are displayed in table 4 by 
depicting the solution terms for the performance di-
mensions: effectiveness, legitimacy, and resilience. The 
analysis shows three possible routes to perceived per-
formance effectiveness. The first configuration consists 
of the combination of no collaboration and polit-
ical network ties (~CA × PN). It suggests that when 
nonprofits do not collaborate with government, a PN 
Table 3. Raw Data Matrix
Conditions Outstanding Performance
Case CA PN CN PER.E PER.L PER.R
C1LA 0.67 1 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.67
C2PU 0.67 1 1 0.67 1 0.67
C3GE 0.33 1 0 1 0.33 1
C4LE 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.33
C5CA 0.33 0 0.67 1 1 0.33
C6AU 1 1 0.67 1 1 1
C7HE 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
C8BR 1 1 0.67 0.67 1 0.67
C9AM 1 1 0.67 0.67 1 0.67
C10GR 0.33 1 0.67 1 0.67 0.67
C11ZW 0 0 0.33 0 0 0
C12RO 1 0.67 1 1 0.67 0
C13AM 1 1 0.67 0.33 1 0.33
C14UT 0 0 0.67 0.67 0.33 1.00
Note: CA, collaborative activities; PN, political network ties; CN, community network ties; PER-E, effective performance; PER-L, legitimate 
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is sufficient to result in performance effectiveness. The 
second configuration (~CA × CN) suggests that in case 
of no collaboration, CN ties are sufficient for perform-
ance effectiveness. The third configuration (PN × CN) 
is all about network ties, showing that PN and CN 
of the nonprofits also prove to be relevant conditions 
individually for explaining performance effectiveness. 
Likewise, the analysis shows that the combination of 
bridging political and bonding community network 
ties (PN × CN) is sufficient for perceived perform-
ance legitimacy. Finally, the analysis shows, based on 
our three involved conditions, one route to achieve 
perceived performance resiliency. The configuration 
consists of the combination of no collaboration and 
political network ties (~CA × PN). It suggests that 
when nonprofits do not collaborate with government, 
a PN is sufficient for performance resilience.
Evaluating the Three Interpretations
The first interpretation expects that collaborating with 
government is crucial for perceived outstanding per-
formance of community-based nonprofits. Accordingly, 
hypothesis 1 states that collaborating with government 
is a necessary condition for outstanding performance. 
This hypothesis is not supported. Engaging in CA 
with government is neither necessary nor sufficient, 
for achieving outstanding performance. The second 
interpretation states that collaboration with govern-
ment should be avoided for perceived outstanding per-
formance of community-based nonprofits. Likewise, 
hypothesis 2 states that the absence of collaboration 
is a necessary condition for outstanding performance. 
We, however, found that the absence of CA is neither 
necessary nor sufficient, for achieving outstanding per-
formance. Hence, this hypothesis is not supported. The 
third interpretation considers that the effect of col-
laboration is contingent on its interplay with the PN 
and CN of community-based nonprofits. In line with 
this expectation, hypothesis 3 states—as an extension 
of the first interpretation—that engaging in CA with 
government when combined with PN ties or with CN 
ties is sufficient for perceived outstanding perform-
ance of nonprofits. This hypothesis is not supported. 
Hypothesis 4 states that the absence of CA in combin-
ation with PN or CN ties is sufficient for outstanding 
performance of nonprofits. This hypothesis, which is 
an extension of the second interpretation, is supported 
for performance effectiveness and resilience.
Qualitative Mechanisms
This study shows that the third perspective, which 
highlights the importance of PN and CN ties, is the 
most insightful explanation for the perceived perform-
ance of community-based nonprofits. We will illustrate 
the results by referring to six concrete cases. Table 5 
depicts a key case for each specific solution path.
Conclusion and Discussion
Despite the fundamental theoretical debate on the 
relationship between government collaboration and 
the perceived performance of community-based 
nonprofits, to date, there has been little empirical re-
search that systematically assesses the key assump-
tions underlying this debate. Responding to calls to 
blend multiple theoretical perspectives in studying 
government–nonprofit collaboration, this article dem-
onstrates the potential of combining governance, 
nonprofit, and social capital literature to capture its 
complexity (see Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2016; 
Cornforth, Hayes, and Vangen 2015; Gazley and Guo 
2020). This study contributes to the empirical evalu-
ation of the importance of different components of the 
government–nonprofit relationship by testing three 
ideal-typical theoretical interpretations of the rela-
tionship: one based on the collaborative governance 
literature, one based on the nonprofit literature, and 
one based on the social capital literature.
This study demonstrates the pivotal role of the 
network ties of nonprofits in understanding the rela-
tionship between collaboration and perceived perform-
ance. There are multiple ways to achieve performance 
Table 4. Sufficient Conditions for Outstanding Perceived Performance (Intermediate Solution)
Performance Effectiveness Performance Legitimacy Performance Resilience
Path 1 Path 2 Path 3 Path 1 Path 1
Configuration ~CA × PN ~CA × CN PN × CN PN × CN ~CA × PN
Consistency 1.000 0.910 0.894 1.000 1.000
Raw coverage 0.296 0.357 0.608 0.681 0.347
Unique coverage 0.074 0.143 0.395 – –
Solution consistency 0.846   1.000 1.000
Solution PRI 0.779   1.000 1.000
Solution coverage 0.817   0.681 0.347
Note: CA, collaborative activities; PN, political network ties; CN, community network ties. The third path (or term) of effective perform-
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effectiveness: via a community route, via a political route, 
or via a combination of the two. In the last route, in 
which both types of network ties are present, it does not 
matter whether or not the nonprofits collaborate with 
government. What it does depend on however is the spe-
cific type and scope of the nonprofits’ goals to determine 
which route is most appropriate. Both types of ties (pol-
itical and community) are also important for achieving 
performance legitimacy. Here, also, it does not matter 
whether or not the nonprofits collaborate with govern-
ment. When it concerns performance resilience, there is 
one route that is sufficient: a political one. In sum, this 
study offers evidence that collaboration is not neces-
sary or sufficient for perceived outstanding performance. 
Some routes, namely those leading to performance effect-
iveness and resiliency, even require nonprofits that are in 
possession of a political network (PN) or community net-
work (CN) to avoid government collaborations. In these 
cases, the benefits generated by these collaborations do 
not off-set the costs of maintaining the collaboration. If 
the time-consuming nature and the costs associated with 
collaboration and forfeiting autonomy are not off-set by 
accessing additional resources, collaboration becomes a 
liability. It would be very interesting to see if these re-
sults also hold in future research endeavors that use other, 
more objective, ways to evaluate performance.
Several limitations apply to this study. The first limi-
tation concerns the generalizability of the findings. 
As the community-based nonprofits in this study’s 
sample are focused on a specific country, a specific 
sector (e.g., health and human services), and on a spe-
cific timeframe for their operations, future research 
could replicate the analysis to assess whether the re-
sults also hold for nonprofits that operate in different 
countries, different sectors, and that have, for example, 
been operating for decades (see Gazley and Guo 2020; 
Guo and Acar 2005; Young 2000). Hence, general-
ization of this study’s contributions should be treated 
with care. The second limitation concerns the way this 
study measures network ties. The measure used here, 
“contact frequency,” does not fully capture the specific 
empirical nature and quality of the contacts. Is the con-
tact, for instance, mainly digital or does it take place 
in person? Is the contact positively perceived on both 
sides? Future studies could take a wider array of com-
munication modes into account to assess the types of 
bridging and bonding ties and how they constitute so-
cial capital (see Provan et al. 2005). The third limitation 
concerns the relatively low coverage of performance 
resilience. The low coverage is in line with our expect-
ations as the literature indicates that the performance 
resilience of community-based nonprofits can only be 
partly explained by network and collaborative condi-
tions. Conditions such as organizational capacity, lead-
ership, and local policy context are also very important 
in this respect (see Nederhand et  al. 2016). As these 
conditions were neglected in this study, future research 
could contribute to gaining a fuller understanding of 
performance resilience.
Despite the limited scope of this study’s empirical 
data, we believe this article can serve as a stepping 
stone for further scholarship seeking to uncover the 
potentials and pitfalls of collaboration and, most im-
portantly, under which conditions collaborations 
thrive (see Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2016; Douglas 
et  al. 2020; Hall and Battaglio 2018). By using an 
innovative set-theoretical approach, this article em-
pirically shows that to fully understand and explain 
the relationship between collaboration and perceived 
performance, the type of the nonprofits’ goals and 
their network ties should be considered. These set-
theoretical findings are a first important contribution 
to the rapidly growing field of nonprofit collabor-
ation research in understanding and explaining the 
effectiveness of government–nonprofit collaboration 
(Cornforth, Hayes, and Vangen 2015; Gazley and Guo 
2020; Stone and Sandfort 2009). Furthermore, this 
study demonstrates the importance of the PN ties of 
community-based nonprofits in achieving perform-
ance legitimacy and resiliency. To date, the role of PN 
ties in contextualizing the nonprofit–government re-
lationship and its performance has been virtually ig-
nored. This is surprising as dynamics in the political 
environment can strongly affect nonprofit–govern-
ment collaborations (Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2016; 
Stone and Sandfort 2009). These collaborations often 
imply decisions about deploying or redeploying signifi-
cant amounts of resources, which is a strongly politi-
cized process (Nielsen and Baekgaard 2015; Perry and 
Rainey 1988). This study, therefore, lends support to 
the view that studying collaboration mainly as a man-
agerial challenge, in isolation from political processes, 
misses the mark (Huxham and Vangen 2005; O’Toole 
and Meier 2004). By focusing attention on the political 
aspect of government–nonprofit collaboration, this art-
icle provides important new insights for enriching and 
deepening our knowledge on collaboration processes.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Calibration of Perceived Outstanding Performance














C1LA 3.50 3.00 3.25 0.33 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.67 3.00 0.67
C2PU 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.67 5.00 4.50 4.75 1 3.00 0.67
C3GE 5.00 4.00 4.50 1 4.00 3.00 3.50 0.33 5.00 1
C4LE 2.50 4.00 3.25 0.33 3.50 3.00 3.25 0.33 2.50 0.33
C5CA 5.00 5.00 5.00 1 5.00 5.00 5.00 1 2.00 0.33
C6AU 5.00 5.00 5.00 1 5.00 5.00 5.00 1 5.00 1
C7HE 3.00 4.00 3.50 0.33 4.00 3.00 3.50 0.33 2.00 0.33
C8BR 4.50 4.00 4.25 0.67 4.50 5.00 4.75 1 3.00 0.67
C9AM 3.00 4.50 3.75 0.33 5.00 4.50 4.75 1 3.00 0.67
C10GR 5.00 4.00 4.50 1 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.67 3.00 0.67
C11ZW 1.00 1.00 1.00 0 2.00 1.00 1.50 0 1.00 0
C12RO 4.00 5.00 4.50 1 3.50 5.00 4.25 0.67 1.50 0
C13AM 4.00 4.33 4.17 0.67 5.00 4.00 4.50 1 2.00 0.33
C14UT 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.67 4.00 3.00* 3.50 0.33 4.00 1.00
Note I: Performance dimensions are rated by respondents with 1–5 stars (1 star = bad performance, 5 stars = outstanding performance). 
When respondents within government or nonprofits scored specific performance dimensions differently, the average score is calculated. Based 
on in-depth knowledge of the cases the following thresholds were set for set membership of the set performance effectiveness and legitimacy: 
Score of 2.50 or lower = 0.00; between 2.51–3.99 = 0.33; between 4.00–4:49 = 0.67; score of 4.50 or higher = 1.00. Based on in-depth know-
ledge on the cases the following thresholds were set for set membership of the set performance resilience: Score of 1.99 or lower = 0.00; be-
tween 2.00–2.99 = 0.33; between 3:00–3:99 = 0.67; score of 4.00 or higher = 1.00.
Note II: For the case C14UT the public official could not answer the questions about legitimacy (due to a self-indicated lack of insight), therefore the 
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Government Total Av. Set Score Score Set Score Total Final Score
C1LA 2.00 0.67 2.00 4.00 3.00 0.33 Yes 1.00 2 0.67
C2PU 1.00 1.00 5.00 4.00 4.50 1.00 No 0.00 2 0.67
C3GE 2.00 0.67 1.00 2.00 1.50 0.00 No 0.00 1 0.33
C4LE 2.00 0.67 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.67 No 0.00 2 0.67
C5CA 3.00 0.33 4.00 1.00 2.50 0.33 Yes 1.00 1 0.33
C6AU 2.00 0.67 5.00 4.00 4.50 1.00 Yes 1.00 3 1.00
C7HE 2.00 0.67 1.00 3.00 2.00 0.00 Yes 1.00 2 0.67
C8BR 1.00 1.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 1.00 Yes 1.00 3 1.00
C9AM 1.00 1.00 4.00 3.00 3.50 0.67 Yes 1.00 3 1.00
C10GR 3.00 0.33 1.00 4.00 2.50 0.33 Yes 1.00 1 0.33
C11ZW 3.00 0.33 1.00 2.00 1.50 0.00 No 0.00 0 0.00
C12RO 1.00 1.00 5.00 3.00 4.00 0.67 Yes 1.00 3 1.00
C13AM 1.00 1.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 1.00 Yes 1.00 3 1.00
C14UT 3.00 0.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 No 0.00 0 0.00
Total   44.00 45.00       
Note I: Dialogue is measured by the frequency score of contact between nonprofits and public officials: 1 = weekly contact (fuzzy score = 1); 
2 = monthly contact (fuzzy score = 0.67); 3 = once a half year contact (fuzzy score = 0.33); 4 = once a year contact (fuzzy score = 0.33); 
5 = never contact (fuzzy score = 0.00). When respondents within nonprofits scored the frequency of contact differently, the highest score was 
used.
Note II: Joint activities refer to being involved in a process of co-creating policies and policy objectives rated by answering the following question on 
a 5-point scale: “We as nonprofit are actively involved in drafting relevant municipal policies” (1 = totally disagree, 5 = totally agree). When respond-
ents within nonprofits or government scored shared decision-making differently, the highest score was used. Based on in-depth knowledge of the cases, 
the following thresholds were set for shared decision-making: between 1.00–2.00 = 0.00; between 2.01–3.00 = 0.33; between 3.01–4.00 = 0.67; between 
4.01–5.00 = 1.00.
Note III: Resource exchange relationship: the presence of contractual financial exchange relationship is indicated with 1.00, the absence of this relation-
ship with 0.00.
Note IV: Fuzzy set score collaborative activities (CA) is determined as follows: no relationship activities = 0.00; one relationship activity = 0.33; two re-
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Table A3. Calibration of Political Network (PN) Ties
Contact Frequency Elected 
Officeholders
Contact Frequency Local 
Council Members Total
Case Score Set Score Score Set Score Total Final Score
C1LA 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 2 1.00
C2PU 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 2 1.00
C3GE 2.50 0.67 1.00 1.00 2 1.00
C4LE 2.50 0.67 3.00 0.33 1 0.33
C5CA 3.00 0.33 3.00 0.33 0 0.00
C6AU 2.00 1.00 2.00* 1.00 2 1.00
C7HE 5.00 0.00 2.00 1.00 1 0.33
C8BR 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 2 1.00
C9AM 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 2 1.00
C10GR 2.50* 0.67 2.00 1.00 2 1.00
C11ZW 5.00 0.00 5.00 0.00 0 0.00
C12RO 3.00 0.33 1.00 1.00 1 0.67
C13AM 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 2 1.00
C14UT 5.00 0.00 3.00 0.33 0 0.00
Total 39.50  32.00    
Note I: Frequency score of contact between nonprofits and elected officeholders and local council members: 1 = weekly contact (fuzzy 
score = 1); 2 = monthly contact (fuzzy score = 1.00); 2.50 = once a few months (added on the request of respondents, fuzzy score = 0.67); 
3 = once a half year contact (fuzzy score = 0.33); 4 = once a year contact (fuzzy score = 0.33); 5 = never contact (fuzzy score = 0.00). When 
respondents scored the frequency of contact differently the highest score was used.
Note II: Fuzzy set score of Political Network Ties (PN) is determined as follows: Membership in both sets = 1; no membership in both sets = 0.00. If a 
case is member of only one set, compute the frequency scores, if the computed score exceeds the cross-over value of 5 than = 0.33 (C4LE and C7HE); if 
the computed score falls below 5 than = 0.67 (C12RO).
Note III: For the C10GR case, the score is adjusted one point lower on the basis of qualitative interview data, marked by the * sign.
Note IV: For the C6AU case, the score is adjusted one point lower on the basis of qualitative interview data, marked by the * sign.
Table A4. Calibration of Community Network (CN) Ties



















Note: Frequency score of contact between nonprofits and commu-
nity grassroot organizations: 1 = weekly contact (fuzzy score = 1); 
2 = monthly contact (fuzzy score = 0.67); 3 = once a half year contact 
(fuzzy score = 0.33); 4 = once a year contact (fuzzy score = 0.00); 
5 = never contact (fuzzy score = 0.00). When respondents scored the 
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Appendix B
Table B1. Truth Table for Effective Performance
Row Number CA PN CN Outcome N Incl. PRI Cases
3 0 1 0 1 1 1.000 1.000 C3GE
4 0 1 1 1 1 1.000 1.000 C10GR
8 1 1 1 1 7 0.880 0.798 C1LA, C2PU, C6AU, C8BR, C9AM, C12RO, C13AM
2 0 0 1 1 2 0.858 0.754 C5CA, C14UT
6 1 0 1 0 1 0.795 0.660 C4LE
5 1 0 0 0 1 0.744 0.493 C7HE
1 0 0 0 0 1 0.663 0.330 C11ZW
7 1 1 0 ? 0 – – –
Table B2. Truth Table for Legitimate Performance
Row 
Number CA PN CN Outcome N
Raw 
Consistency PRI Cases
8 1 1 1 1 7 1.000 1.000 C1LA, C2PU, C6AU, C8BR, 
C9AM, C12RO, C13AM
4 0 1 1 1 1 1.000 1.000 C10GR
3 0 1 0 0 1 0.829 0.000 C3GE
6 1 0 1 0 1 0.795 0.493 C4LE
5 1 0 0 0 1 0.744 0.493 C7HE
2 0 0 1 0 2 0.712 0.500 C5CA, C14UT
1 0 0 0 0 1 0.663 0.330 C11ZW
7 1 1 0 ? 0 – – –
Table B3. Truth Table for Resilient Performance
Row Number CA PN CN Outcome N Incl. PRI Cases
3 0 1 0 1 1 1.000 1.000 C3GE
4 0 1 1 1 1 1.000 1.000 C10GR
8 1 1 1 0 7 0.822 0.668 C1LA, C2PU, C6AU, C8BR, C9AM, C12RO, C13AM
5 1 0 0 0 1 0.744 0.000 C7HE 
2 0 0 1 0 2 0.712 0.500 C5CA, C14UT
1 0 0 0 0 1 0.663 0.330 C11ZW
6 1 0 1 0 1 0.596 0.000 C4LE
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Appendix C
Effective Performance PER.E
No necessary conditions were found for Effective Performance that meet criteria consistency threshold 0.90, 
coverage threshold 0.60, Relevance of Necessity (RoN) threshold 0.55.
Table C1. Conservative Solution for Effective 
Performance
Configurations
Path 1 Path 2 Path 3
~CA × PN ~CA × CN PN × CN
Consistency 1.000 0.910 0.841
PRI 1.000 0.836 0.750
Raw coverage 0.296 0.370 0.593
Unique coverage 0.074 0.149 0.372
Solution consistency 0.846   
Solution coverage 0.817   
Note I: Inclusion cut 0.85.
Note II: The third path contains two cases that qualify as true logical 
contradictions.




Path 1 Path 2
 PN ~CA × CN
Consistency 0.750 0.910
PRI 0.668 0.836
Raw coverage 0.778 0.370
Unique coverage 0.557 0.149
Solution consistency 0.758  
Solution coverage 0.927  
Note I: Inclusion cut 0.85.
Note II: The first path contains cases that qualify as true logical 
contradictions.
Table C3. Intermediate Solution for Effective 
Performance
Configurations
Path 1 Path 2 Path 3
~CA × PN ~CA × CN PN × CN
Consistency 1.000 0.910 0.841
PRI 1.000 0.836 0.750
Raw coverage 0.296 0.370 0.593
Unique coverage 0.074 0.149 0.372
Solution consistency 0.846   
Solution coverage 0.817   
Note I: Inclusion cut 0.85.
Note II: The third path contains two cases that qualify as true logical 
contradictions.
Note III: Directional expectations: no expectations for CA, positive ex-
pectations for PN and CN.















Note: Inclusion cut 0.85.











Note: Inclusion cut 0.85.
Legitimate Performance PER.L
No necessary conditions were found for Legitimate Performance that meet criteria consistency threshold 0.90, 
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Note I: Inclusion cut 0.85.
Note II: Directional expectations: no expectations for CA, positive ex-
pectations for PN and CN.
Resilient Performance PER.R
No necessary conditions were found for Resilient Performance that meet criteria consistency threshold 0.90, 
coverage threshold 0.60, Relevance of Necessity (RoN) threshold 0.55.











Note: Inclusion cut 0.85.











Note: Inclusion cut 0.85.











Note I: Inclusion cut 0.85.
Note II: Directional expectations: no expectations for CA, positive ex-
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